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LIBERTY FOR WOMEN: FREEDOM AND FEMINISM IN THE TWENTY­
FIRST CENTURY. Edited by Wendy McElroy. Chicago: Independent 
Institute. 2002. Pp. xiv, 353. $30. 
Laws should be judged not by their words or intentions, but by 
their effects and consequences. When government· enacts laws 
designed to benefit one group, society should judge those laws first by 
examining whether they have, in practice, provided a net benefit to the 
law's intended beneficiaries. Next, any such benefit must be weighed 
against the costs imposed on the rest of society. If the benefits 
outweigh the costs, this is a socially efficient law. Government should 
repeal a law when the costs it imposes outweigh its benefits. When 
laws do not provide a net benefit to the group they are designed to 
assist but nonetheless provide an overall social net benefit, these laws 
may be retained. These laws, however, can no longer stand on the 
discredited proposition that they benefit the intended group. 
!feminism, or Individualist Feminism, is a branch of feminism 
based on classical liberal philosophy. !feminism advocates repeal of 
many laws concerning women's issues. !feminists view individual 
autonomy as paramount and believe that laws restricting women's 
choices do more harm than good. In some cases, empirical, anecdotal, 
and historical evidence support such a belief. These are the easy cases. 
In other cases, however, the evidence is weaker or unavailable; there, 
ifeminists can only support their positions by relying on the dogma of 
individual rights. 
A recent collection of articles, Liberty for Women: Freedom and 
Feminism in the Twenty-First Century, presents a thorough discussion 
of the ifeminist view. Liberty for Women makes strides in showing that 
treating women as a separate group in need of protection is demean­
ing and ultimately harmful to women's interests. In order to persuade 
readers of their free-market/individualist points of view, the articles' 
authors must confront the likely response of the other side. For some 
topics, the authors' logical arguments are buttressed by statistics and 
anecdotal evidence. For others, however, the reader must take Liberty 
for Women's arguments on faith. Even so, the book presents argu­
ments that those concerned with women's issues should not dismiss or 
discount out of hand. 
1602 
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This Notice reviews Liberty for Women and finds that, at least in 
some cases, Liberty for Women makes powerful and persuasive argu­
ments that should reframe the women's issues policy debate.' Part I 
examines the evolution of feminist theories and presents the basic 
ifeminism model. Parts II and III consider several women's issues and 
analyze whether ifeminism provides a convincing framework for 
considering an issue's impact on women. Part II finds that for some 
issues, statistical and anecdotal evidence support the conclusion that 
individual liberty benefits women more than laws designed to protect 
them. Part III, however, shows the weaknesses of Liberty for Women's 
arguments when considering issues where the effect of laws designed 
to benefit women is unclear. 
I. WHAT IS !FEMINISM?· 
While feminists do not agree on what feminism means,2 most agree 
that the feminist movement began with the abolitionist-suffragettes. 3 
These pioneering women have been called the "first-wave" feminists.4 
Women could not vote until 1920; they could not be legislators; 
they could not serve on juries; and they could not be judges.5 They 
1. This Notice assumes that the audience for the debate between radical-feminist theo­
rists and the ifeminist authors featured in Liberty for Women are women who are committed 
to neither view beforehand. 
2. See, e.g., Christine L. Williams, Preface to 571 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 
8, 8-9 (2000) (Opening a special issue devoted to the progress and future of the feminist 
movement, Professor Williams notes that "[i]t was surprising to [her] that few of the authors 
attempted to define feminism themselves . . . .  [F]eminism is a movement that refuses to be 
pinned down, even by its proponents. "). For some of feminism's varied definitions and goals, 
see, for examples, BARBARA ARNEIL, POLITICS AND FEMINISM 3-4 (1999) explaining how 
feminism is: 
[t]he recognition that, virtually across time and place, men and women are unequal in the 
power they have, either in society or over their own lives, and the corollary belief that men 
and women should be equal; the belief that knowledge has been written about, by and for 
men and the corollary belief that all schools of knowledge must be re-examined and under­
stood to reveal the extent to which they ignore or distort gender. 
Id.; POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983) (ar­
guing that the goal of feminism is to empower women); Ruth Colker, Feminism, Sexuality, 
and Self' A Preliminary Inquiry into the Politics of Authenticity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 217, 217 
(1988) (reviewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)) ("Femi­
nism aspires to assist us to come closer to discovering and experiencing our authentic 
selves. "); and Rosemarie Tong, 572 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 184, 185 (2000) 
(book review) (The goal of feminism is to "eradicat[ e J the oppression of women. "). 
3. See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST 
JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 1-16 (1994) (describing the activities of the 
"abolitionist feminists " and the "suffrage feminists "); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, 
GAYS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN 
CULTURE AND LAW 63-198 (1998) (same). 
4. See, e.g., Marina Angel, Susan Glaspell's Trifles and A Jury of Her Peers: Woman 
Abuse in a Literary and Legal Context, 45 BUFF. L. REY. 779, 790 (1997). 
5. "The first wave of feminism saw both the vote and the right to serve on juries as es­
sential political rights in a democracy. " Angel, supra note 4, at 832. 
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had little to no direct control over or say in how the law affected 
their lives.6 Women organized the first movements to correct their 
"obscurity and even invisibility in the law." 7 
In the Introduction to Liberty for Women, editor Wendy McElroy8 
details the historical background of the feminist movement beginning 
with the first-wave abolitionist/suffragettes (pp. 5-14 ). While the aboli­
tionist movement "declared that each human being was a self-owner" 
(p. 5), not all male abolitionists agreed this sentiment applied 
to women as well as slaves (p. 6). The feminist movement was 
born, according to McElroy, when "[a]bolitionist women began to ask 
themselves, 'Do not we - as women - own ourselves as well? Or 
do we fight only for the rights of male slaves?' " (p. 6). Following 
enfranchisement of all men regardless of race or color via the 
Fifteenth Amendment, feminists focused on extending suffrage to 
women as well (p. 8). From this point on, the women's rights move­
ment took its own path separate, but parallel to, the continuing efforts 
to end race discrimination.9 
These early feminists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries did not always agree with each other about the movement's 
goals.1 °  For example, some women's groups supported "protective" 
labor laws limiting the hours of work for women as part of a larger 
effort to use government regulation to limit work hours of all workers, 
male and female.11 Other women's groups fought against these laws as 
6. See, e.g., id. at 795 ("Laws excluded women from the public sphere by denying [them] 
the right to participate in government. Laws denied [women] the right to economic inde­
pendence by prohibiting [them] from having an occupation or profession, holding property 
or maintaining a legal status independent of [their] fathers or husbands."). 
7. Lisa R. Pruitt, A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, 16 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 183, 
188 (1994). 
8. Research Fellow, The Independent Institute. 
9. See pp. 6-7, 32. · 
The Fifteenth Amendment assured that the right to vote could not be abridged because of 
"race, color, or previous condition of servitude." It made no reference to sex. The abolition­
ist women felt betrayed by their male counterparts at whose behest they had subordinated 
their own political interests in favor of blacks . ... Susan B. Anthony pleaded, "We [women] 
have stood with the black man in the Constitution over half a century . ... Enfranchise him, 
and we are left outside with lunatics, idiots, and criminals. " 
P. 7. 
10. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The 
Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (1995) (detailing the 1920s 
debate among feminists about the wisdom of an Equal Rights Amendment which might pre­
clude protective laws for women); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Ven­
ture: An Overview of Women's Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twen­
tieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2027 n.53 (2000) (describing how the feminist 
movement was splintered regarding strategy to achieve suffrage). 
11. JULIE NOVKOV, CONSTITUTING WORKERS, PROTECTING WOMEN 133 (2001). 
Novkov describes the movement's growing divide: 
The final battles for and passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in the state legislatures had 
promoted unity among women's groups but could not completely mask growing differences 
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limiting the opportunities of women to support themselves and their 
families.1 2  
Meanwhile, other women fought for freedom outside the work­
place. These early ancestors of individual feminists advocated sexual 
freedom by calling for "marriage reforms that ensured women's 
equality and free access to birth control information"; "free thought" 
by insisting on "leaving all spiritual matters to the conscience of 
individuals"; and "individualist [a]narch[y]" through "society by 
contract" (p. 8). McElroy points out that the "free love" movement 
had the most resonance with early ifeminists (p. 8). For example, it 
was these feminists who were the first to call forced sex in marriage 
"rape" (p. 8); the first to demand access to birth-control information 
(p. 8); and the first to raise the ire of Anthony Comstock, whose 
infamous Comstock Act13 banned the dissemination of that same birth 
control information as obscene.14 
After the Nineteenth Amendment's passage guaranteed women 
the right to vote, the movement became relatively silent. 1 5  What little 
debate there was in the 1930s and early 1940s concerned whether 
women should be "protected" from long work hours, unsafe working 
conditions, and low-paying jobs.1 6 As men fought in World War II, 
more women entered the workforce to replace the soldiering male 
regarding both tactics and goals. In the decade after 1910, some feminist activists concluded 
that supporting protective labor legislation aimed specifically at women was no longer a wise 
tactic. Others remained convinced that only support for such legislation would lead to the 
adoption of universal legislation. Still others began to express the view that while universal 
legislation was desirable, women would always need a higher degree of protection than men. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
12. NOVKOV, supra note 11. 
13. Pp. 51-53; MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE 
FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 176-77 (1985). The Comstock Act banned 
materials that included information about contraception and carried a penalty of up to ten 
years of hard labor and/or a $5,000 fine for violations. Id. 
14. P. 8. Feminists fought against increasing restrictions on sexual autonomy: 
At the turn of the century, the repression of sexuality within American society remained 
pervasive. With the assassination of McKinley, political radicalism in almost all forms was 
suppressed as well, thereby silencing many ifeminists. World War I - with the expanded 
governmental powers and the political intolerance that it ushered in - dealt a further blow 
to individualist movements in general. 
P. 10. 
Eventually, the United States Supreme Court held state laws similar to the Comstock 
Act unconstitutional violations of the right to privacy. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
15. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2113-14 (2002) ("Yet 
once [women] had won the franchise, feminist politics went into partial hibernation . . . .  "). 
16. P. 11. See NOVKOV, supra note 11, at 183-239 for a detailed account of the debate 
about minimum wages for women, specifically, and workers, generally, during this time. 
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workers.1 7 When the War ended, the government encouraged women 
to return to their more traditional roles as wife and mother and to 
leave the wage-earning for their husbands.1 8 Many did but, impor­
tantly, some did not. These working women sowed the seeds for later 
efforts to ensure equal pay for equal work19 and employment antidis­
crimination laws2 0 to protect women in the workplace. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, feminist theory enjoyed a resurgence, 
calling for women to discard their notions of inferiority and stand toe­
to-toe with men. This new "second-wave" of feminism21 led by Betty 
Friedan,22 Simone De Beauvior,23 and others urged women to burn 
their bras, "not iron while the strike was hot,"24 discard notions of 
women's rightful place being in the home, and demand equal rights 
and equal pay for equal work. This movement lost most of its steam 
following the Equal Rights Amendment's failure in 1982.25 
Out of the ashes of that grassroots activity arose a movement in 
academia - often called "radical feminism" - that concentrated on 
gender rights within a patriarchal system.26 Two women stood out 
in this movement - Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin. 
17. MAUREEN HONEY, CREATING ROSIE THE RIVETER: CLASS, GENDER, AND 
PROPAGANDA DURING WORLD WAR II (1984); Michael C. Dorf, The Paths to Legal 
Equality: A Reply to Dean Sullivan, 90 CAL. L. REV. 791, 798 (2002). 
18. See THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ROSIE THE RIVETER (Clarity Productions 1980) (de­
picting the propaganda campaign launched at the end of World War II to persuade women 
who had responded to the patriotic call to ·enter the wartime industrial labor force to return 
to homemaking at war's end). 
19. The Equal Pay Act passed in 1963. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000). 
20. When Title VII passed in 1964, it prohibited employment discrimination based on 
sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2003). 
21. See, e.g., Tong, supra note 2, at 1 84. 
22. See BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1963). 
23. See SIMONE DE BEAUVIOR, THE SECOND SEX (1952). 
24. This phrase was the slogan of the 1970 Women's Equality Day commemorating the 
fiftieth anniversary of women's suffrage. 
· 
25. Congress passed the amendment in 1972, but the amendment failed to garner the 
necessary support of thirty-eight states before the self-imposed 1982 deadline. Ironically, the 
failure of the amendment may have been a blessing in disguise for some feminists, especially 
second-wave feminists, because passage of the amendment would have precluded any laws 
that singled out women for beneficial treatment. "The Equal Rights Amendment ('ERA') 
(may] have forbidden all exclusions used to deny access to a benefit based upon gender." 
Christopher H. Pyle, Women's Colleges: ls Segregation by Sex Still Justifiable After United 
States v. Virginia?, 77 B.U. L. REV. 209, 220 (1997). Many of the laws debated today - from 
affirmative action plans to same sex colleges - may have failed that test. Not all feminists, 
however, supported the ERA for precisely this reason. 
26. "The dominant trend in modern feminism (also known as Second Wave feminism, 
gender feminism, equity feminism, etc.) has evolved from one of equality-seeking to one in­
tensely focused on women's victimization by men. " Holly J. Wilmet, Naked Feminism: The 
Unionization of the Adult Entertainment Industry, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 
465, 495 n.194 (1999); see also JOANN BREN GUERNSEY, VOICES OF FEMINISM: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 52 (1996). 
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Radical feminists2 7  called not for equal rights but more protections to 
compensate for the twisted notions of gender relations the patriarchal 
system forced women to accept.2 8  The literature, especially the works 
of Catharine MacKinnon,29 concentrated on dominance issues.30 To 
MacKinnon, all relations between men and women are really relation­
ships of dominance and submission. Every male action is designed to 
"systematically empower[] men, while subordinating women and en­
dangering their lives and bodily integrity."31 According to MacKinnon, 
our system is fundamentally flawed and women are constantly 
oppressed by men. Any advances by women meet with male 
backlashes that cause women to regress into traditional, self­
destructive behaviors.32 Even governmental actions that appear to 
benefit women are just means to placate them.33 
Radical feminism is the ideology that views men and women as 
separate and politically antagonistic classes. Men oppress women. 
They do so through the twin evils of the patriarchal state and the free­
market system. The goal of radical feminism is not equality with men: 
it is gender justice (equity) for women as a class (p. 14). 
While second-wave feminists, like Friedan, strove to expand 
women's opportunities, radical feminism claims these "opportunities" 
present women with a false choice34 because patriarchy clouds all 
women's judgments. This viewpoint led many radical feminists, in-
27. Most scholarly literature concerning feminism refers to "dominance feminists", such 
as Catharine MacKinnon, as "radical feminists." This Notice will continue that tradition. 
28. MacKinnon dislikes the sameness/difference debate because she believes it distracts 
from the dominance/submission debate. Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law - A 
Conversation, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 11 (1985); see also Joan Williams, Is Law an Art or a 
Science?: Comments on Objectivity, Feminism, and Power, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y 
& L. 373, 379 (1998). 
29. "The most well-known and influential of [radical) feminists is . . . Catharine 
MacKinnon. Her development of dominance theory effected one [of) the most significant 
paradigm shifts in feminist legal theory. Showing how dominance is eroticized, she has ar­
gued for reform of harassment, rape, and pornography law." Adrienne D. Davis, Straight­
ening It Out: Joan Williams on Unbending Gender, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 824 n.5 (2000). 
30. Catharine MacKinnon, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE 
ON LIFE AND LAW 46 (Catherine Stimpson ed., 1987); see also, e.g., CAROL SMART, 
FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LA w 86 (1 989) (suggesting that the adversary system of law 
injects male domination into our legal system). 
31. Davis, supra note 29, at 824 n.5; see, e.g., IN HARM'S w A Y: PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL 
RIGHTS HEARINGS (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Andrea Dworkin eds., 1997) (examining 
how pornography harms women). 
32. KAREN LEHRMAN, THE LIPSTICK PROVISO: WOMEN, SEX & POWER IN THE REAL 
WORLD 9 (1997). 
33. "The prevailing feminist analysis of American society as systematically unfair to 
women inevitably [led) some to regard liberty as a male prerogative, even a tool of male op­
pression. " P. xi. 
34. "[C]hoice is a central problem [for radical] feminist theory because much of the 
agenda of second-wave feminism was to enable women to be respected as agents and 
autonomous of their husbands."  Davis, supra note 29, at 828 n.19. 
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eluding MacKinnon, to discount the importance of individual choice.35 
According to some commentators, this move made "American 
feminism veer toward tyranny after its early successes in the late 
1960s."36 
!feminism stands in contrast to radical feminists.3 7 !feminism 
attempts to return the feminist movement to its earlier roots - the 
ideas of the abolitionist-suffragettes - coupled with a modern under­
standing of how markets work. !feminists believe individuals, includ­
ing women, make the best decisions for themselves and encourage 
women to "vigorously oppose all special protections of women . .. as 
inherently infantilizing" (p. 28). 
!feminism is based upon the belief that all human beings have a 
right to the protection of their persons and property. It consistently 
applies the principle of "a woman's body, a woman's right" to 
every issue that confronts women today from reproductive choice to 
pornography, from economic opportunity to prostitution (p. 5). 
Above all, ifeminists believe in self-ownership. An individual has a 
fundamental right to use "his or her own body" and "his or her capaci­
ties" to maximize his or her own welfare (p. 154). Each individual -
regardless of gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation, etc. -
possesses this right.38 
The only legitimate role of government in the realm of sex rela­
tions, according to ifeminism, is to treat men and women the same 
before the law. Requiring that the government protect the rights of all 
individuals equally - without regard to sex or race - prohibits the 
government from favoring some groups over others or some individu­
als over others (p. 5). Government should be restrained from passing 
facially discriminatory laws. 
35. Choice is impossible because "[w]omen are used, abused, bought, sold, and si­
lenced . . . .  [N]o woman is exempt from this condition from the moment of her birth to the 
moment of her death, in the eyes of the law, or in the memory of her children."  Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793, 796 
(1991). 
36. P. 28. McElroy criticizes radical feminism for its divergence from first-wave and 
individual-feminism norms: 
In the twentieth century, feminist thought has shown a disturbing tendency to jettison the 
individualist and classical liberal foundations that animated the movement in the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. On issues such as free speech, economic liberty, sexual 
liberty, and "victimology" contemporary feminism has advocated approaches which indi­
vidualist feminism rejects as contrary to the interests of both women and men. 
Pp. 167-68. 
37. "The true ideological contest within the movement is between ifeminism and radical 
feminism. " P. 1 6. Holly Wilmet describes ifeminists - she does not use that terminology, 
however - as the critics to the second-wave. Wilmet, supra note 26, at 495 n.194. 
38. This prohibits the use of force by an individual as a means to welfare-maximizing 
ends because any force used will violate someone else's fundamental right of self-ownership. 
"Any other position would imply some form of slavery is acceptable." P. 154. 
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!feminism .. . considers men and women to be human beings whose 
commonality far outweighs any secondary characteristics that might di­
vide them. Men and women share the same political interests. !feminism 
states: in the absence of coercion, pornography and prostitution are 
merely choices; the free market liberates women; and technology can be 
used for good or evil but tends toward the good because it empowers the 
individual. (pp. 14-15) 
Women make choices as individuals, not as groups. For example, 
while women collectively may believe that more women should be 
CEOs of Fortune 500 companies, individual women choose not to 
pursue that path. Though the ideal is never achieved, it would be 
incorrect to assume that any outside dominating force, be it govern­
ment or men in general, caused the outcome. 
II. THE EASY CASES 
While Liberty for Women covers a \Jroad range of women's issues, 
some present easier arguments for ifeminists than others.39 In some 
areas where statistical and anecdotal evidence support a free-market 
position, ifeminism presents a strong rebuttal of the radical feminists' 
creed. These topics fit nicely into the second-wave feminist catch­
phrase: "woman's rights, woman's bodies." This Part considers three 
such issues: pornography, prostitution, and gun ownership. These 
topics concern free speech - the right of each individual to pursue the 
employment of his or her choice - and a woman's right to protect 
herself from aggressors. 
A. Pornography 
Radical feminists have supported strong bans on pornography.4 0 In 
1983, Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon proposed 
ordinances in both the U.S. and Canada that declared pornography to 
be sex discrimination.41 Two U.S. cities and Canada enacted these 
laws.42 The Supreme Court affirmed a Seventh Circuit decision finding 
39. The purpose of the book is not to dissuade radical feminists from their views of a 
dominant patriarchy, but rather to convince women not tied to any feminist philosophy to 
consider ifeminists' arguments. According to Camille Paglia, libertarian feminism is more 
"in tune with a younger, sassier generation of feminists. " P. 28. 
40. See IN HARM'S WAY: PORNOGRAPHY CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS, supra note 31. 
41. See Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and 
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 24-28 (1985); MacKinnon, supra note 35, at 796 
("Women in pornography are bound, battered, tortured, harassed, raped, and sometimes 
killed; or, in the glossy men's entertainment magazines, 'merely' humiliated, molested, 
objectified, and used. "). 
42. The two U.S. cities were Indianapolis, Indiana, and Bellingham, Washington. 
Minneapolis almost enacted a similar ordinance - it was vetoed by the mayor twice. Ann 
Scales, Avoiding Constitutional Depression: Bad Attitudes and the Fate of Butler, in 
FEMINISM AND PORNOGRAPHY 318, 333 n.2 (Drucilla Cornell ed., 2000). 
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one of the ordinances an unconstitutional violation of the First 
Amendment.43 The Canadian Supreme Court, however, upheld the 
ordinance.44 
Liberty for Women, in "On Pornography: Lessons from Enforce­
ment" by Nadine Strossen, favors allowing more freedom of speech, 
even if that speech may be offensive to some women (pp. 45-70). 
Freedom of speech provides those holding minority views with one of 
their most effective tools for promoting societal change.45 Without the 
protection of the right to use provocative speech to grab attention and 
inform through protests, literature, and academia, many of the civil 
rights movements in the United States would probably have been far 
less effective. 
Historically, restrictions on speech end up banning more than just 
targeted speech (p. 47). Laws banning obscene or pornographic con­
tent "have been used to condemn a wide range of views, far beyond 
the legal or dictionary definitions of those terms, and even altogether 
outside the realm of sexuality," such as political dissent.46 When 
government is tasked with defining "obscene" or "pornography" the 
desire for the majority to suppress unpopular minority views becomes 
too great. 
Like other speech restrictions, the danger exists that anti­
pornography statutes could be used against those whom the laws are 
designed to protect.47 For example, governments have used anti­
pornography laws to bar the dissemination of information about sex, 
birth control,48 and feminist and lesbian books and magazines (pp. 48-
66). Interestingly enough, the Canadian anti-pornography ordinance 
stopped two of Andrea Dworkin's books at the United States-Canada 
43. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S. D. Ind. 1984), affd, 771 F.2d 
323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff d mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see also Lynn S. Chancer, From Por­
nography to Sadomasochism: Reconciling Feminist Differences, 571 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & Soc. SCI. 77, 81 (2000). 
44. Butler v. The Queen, [1992] S.C.R. 452; see also Chancer, supra note 43, at 81. 
45. "Throughout history, free speech consistently has been the greatest ally of those 
seeking equal rights for groups that have been subject to discrimination. " Pp. 47-48. 
46. P. 47. "Even in societies that generally respect human rights, including free 
speech . . .  the term 'pornography' tends to be used as an epithet to stigmatize expression 
that is politically or socially unpopular. " Id. 
47. "Rather than curbing speech offensive to minorities, [the British racial hate speech 
law] has instead been used regularly to curb the speech of blacks, trade unionists, and anti­
nuclear activists. " P. 48. The "enforcement record" of anti-speech laws being applied against 
the groups they were designed to protect "should come as a rude awakening to any who be­
lieve that anti-hate-speech laws will protect or benefit racial minorities, women, or any other 
group that has traditionally suffered discrimination. " P. 50. 
48. One of the most well-known laws of this type was the Comstock Act. See 
GROSSBERG, supra note 13. 
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border for a short time because the law's enforcers believed portions 
of the book violated the ordinance.49 
Any scheme for censoring would suppress many works that are valuable 
to women and feminists; would be enforced in a way that discriminates 
against the least popular, least powerful groups in our society, including 
feminists and lesbians; would perpetuate demeaning stereotypes about 
women, including that sex is bad for us; would perpetuate the disempow­
ering notion that women are essentially victims; would harm women who 
voluntarily work in the sex industry; and would reinforce the political 
power of factions with a patriarchal agenda. By undermining free speech, 
censorship would deprive feminists of a powerful tool for advancing 
women's equality. Since sexual freedom and freedom for sexually explicit 
expression are essential aspects of human freedom, censoring such ex­
pression would undermine human rights more broadly. (p. 67) 
Strossen also points out the irony of the anti-pornography femi­
nists using government to achieve· their goals. Government was 
responsible50 for oppressing women through "protective" labor laws, 
restrictions on property ownership, limitations on access to birth 
control and reproductive information, and failure to enforce domestic 
violence and rape laws. First, it is odd that women oppressed by 
government in the past would seek to use government through 
anti-speech laws to oppress others' freedom. Second, trusting the 
patriarchal system that oppressed women in the past to now protect 
women from that same patriarchy seems incongruent. "The funda­
mental premise in the procensorship feminists' philosophy - that 
our entire societal and legal system is patriarchal, reflecting and 
perpetuating the subordination of women - itself conclusively refutes 
their conclusion that we should hand over to that system additional 
power" to regulate expression by regulating pornography (p. 45). 
Anecdotal, historical, and statistical evidence shows that restric­
tions on speech - from hate-speech regulations to bans on pornogra­
phy - hurt the groups they are designed to protect (pp. 48-51 ). !femi­
nism provides a reasoned argument against these regulations and 
deserves consideration when debating the wisdom of adopting such 
laws. 
49. "According to [Canadian] customs, [the books] 'illegally eroticized pain and 
bondage.' " P. 61. "As far as Canada is concerned, Erica Jong's prediction . . .  that 'feminists 
would be the first to suffer' under any newly imposed censorship . . .  is, unfortunately, now a 
description." P. 54. 
50. Radical feminists might argue that it was men who used the government to suppress 
women. Government, however, was the ultimate enforcer of these laws (or the ultimate un­
enforcer in the case of domestic violence and rape laws) even if the laws were passed at the 
behest of the male patriarchy. 
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B. Prostitution 
Prostitution51 presents an interesting area of disagreement between 
radical feminists and ifeminists.52 While radical feminists' theories 
focus on men's dominance and women's victimization, ifeminists view 
the choice to become a prostitute in the same way as the choice to 
undertake any other profession.53 Liberty for Women, in chapters .by 
Norma Jean Almodovar (pp. 71-87) and Martha Nussbaum (pp. 88-
118), advocates legalizing prostitution. Like abortion, prostitution 
involves a woman's decision about what she will and will not do with 
her own body. At root, that decision is a choice and it should be the 
woman's choice, not the government's (p. 75). Either a woman can 
choose an option - including the "good, bad, moral, or immoral" 
ones - or "choice" means nothing (p. 75). If a woman is only allowed 
to choose wisely, she never had any choice to begin with.54 
One argument commonly raised against legalizing prostitution 
concerns the few options facing women who choose to become prosti­
tutes. If a woman with relatively little education and no employable 
skills becomes a prostitute, did she really choose that profession? She 
may not have had any other options. Nussbaum acknowledges the 
argument's validity, but concludes that banning prostitution hurts 
these women more than it helps them (p. 90). The real solution is to 
51. See generally pp. 71-118; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993). This Notice's definition of "prostitution" does not include 
the "forced prostitution" of the sex-slave trade that concerns many international-human 
rights activists. It focuses, instead, on women who decide to trade sexual acts for money. 
Radical feminists would disagree that the latter can ever be a "choice." Both radical femi­
nists and ifeminists agree that the former is never a choice. 
52. Catharine MacKinnon does not agree. She believes that these types of disagree­
ments are just contests between real feminists and fake ones. Thus, in the context of one dis­
pute over whether speakers who favored the legalization of prostitution should be allowed 
to be heard at a law school conference, she is said to have stated, "I don't see this as a fight 
within feminism, but a fight between those who wish to end male supremacy and those who 
wish to do better under it." Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist 
Method, 8 AM. u. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 31, 49-50 (2000) (quoting Tamar Lewin, Fu­
ror on Exhibit at Law School Splits Feminists, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at B9). 
53. Some ifeminists view the efforts to keep prostitution illegal as traitorous moves 
against women. "There are some very angry women [radical feminists] who truly believe that 
it is acceptable to abrogate the freedom of other women to prevent a [perceived] greater 
harm to women as a whole." P. 75. "This prostitute-as-victim theory [extolled by the radical 
feminists,] now so deeply imbedded into law . . .  involves the irrational belief that all women 
except for [radical feminists] and their peers are inherently incapable of self-determination 
and need 'big sister' protection." P. 77. 
' 
54. Even if a woman were only allowed to make the "right" choices, 
[t]he question is, who determines whose values, opinions, and preferences become law in this 
"society"? Who decides what is offensive to us all? If there is a sufficient number of people 
who do not like gays, and there are, and they are vocal enough, should we return to incar­
cerating homosexuals because they offend "society"? 
P. 83. 
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improve the choices these women face, 55 not to "remov[ e] one of the 
options they actually have" (p. 103). 
Anti-prostitution laws marginalize physical and sexual abuse 
claims of prostitutes. Law-enforcement personnel view prostitutes as 
criminals rather than victims (p. 72-73). Writing from her own experi­
ence as a prostitute, Almodovar shows that anti-prostitution laws 
designed to protect women "from the 'exploitation' and degradation 
of prostitution are abused by those who are supposed to uphold them" 
(p. 74). Police officers use laws against prostitution to harass prosti­
tutes, enjoy "freebies" from the women, and discount prostitutes' 
allegations of violent abuse at the hands of their pimps or clients (p. 
80). Because generally applicable laws against violence are not fully 
enforced when the victim is a prostitute, 56 laws against prostitution put 
these women at even greater risk of abuse.5 7  A prostitute, threatened 
with violence from her pimp or a customer, cannot seek protection 
from the police because the law has made her a criminal and the police 
are unlikely to help anyway.58 
C. Gun Ownership 
In Liberty for Women, Richard Stevens, Hugo Teufel III, and 
Matthew Biscan make a persuasive, and all too rarely heard, 59 argu-
55. "The really helpful thing for feminists to ponder, if they deplore the nature of these 
options, will be how to provide more options for these women, through education, skills 
training, and job creation." Pp. 90-91. 
56. In addition to prostitution's illegality, another reason for underenforcement of gen­
erally applicable laws when prostitutes are victims is the stigma attached to prostitution. Po­
lice officers similarly may not enforce anti-violence laws when victims belong to unpopular, 
but legal, groups - strippers, gay men, lesbians, etc. The endogeneity between legal rules 
and social stigmas, however, is beyond the scope of this Notice. 
57. MacKinnon admits that law-enforcement officials practice bias in enforcing anti­
prostitution laws. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Unthinking ERA Thinking, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
759, 769 (1987) (reviewing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1986)) 
("[B]iased enforcement of biased laws against prostitution so that prostitutes (most of them 
women) are harassed and violated while pimps and johns (men) are allowed to ensure that 
prostitution, something men made a crime, will continue to exist for their pleasure."). 
58. "Until we return the control of all individual choices to the individual, the presuma­
bly unintended consequences of protectionist legislation will be the continued victimization 
of those the laws were designed to protect." P. 87. Since virtually every jurisdiction in the 
United States bans prostitution, statistics about the effects of prostitution are hard to come 
by. Some commentators, however, have conducted behavioral studies and found that legal­
izing prostitution may lead to reduced rates of rape. "[A] legislature that valued reduced 
rape more than reduced prostitution might experiment with legalizing prostitution. " Owen 
D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 
CAL. L. REV. 827, 929 (1999). 
59. One commentator who supports gun ownership for women notes that the 
gun-control debate "virtually ignore[s] the extent to which restrictive gun legislation and 
standards of self-defense affect" women. Inge Anna Larish, Note, Why Annie Can't Get Her 
Gun: A Feminist Perspective on the Second Amendment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 507 
(1996). 
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ment in favor of relaxing gun control laws to empower women (pp. 
238-63). Women on average are physically weaker than men and fire­
arms provide one mechanism for countering that disparity. 60 Women, 
of course, are not the only individuals who may own guns - men are 
also gun owners. In a confrontation between an armed man and an 
armed woman, however, the man's physical advantage over the 
woman plays less of a role in the outcome than if both were unarmed. 
Not all women, however, agree on the benefits of gun ownership 
for women. 61 Women, as a group, tend to support restrictions on gun 
ownership. 62 Some commentators suggest that women's general 
aversion to gun ownership may result from the socialization of women 
"that emphasizes maternalism, pacifism, and sympathy for others. " 63 
Society teaches women that they should pursue peaceful resolution of 
conflicts and avoid weapons. From a radical-feminist perspective, 
advocating fewer restrictions on gun ownership "is not powerful - it 
is lethal. For both women and society, a better society is an unarmed 
society" 64 and guns are the weapons of men. 65 
Statistical data, however, support the pro-gun approach. On 
average, the greatest threat to a woman's personal safety comes from 
inside her own home. Data show that "the frequency of wife-on­
husband assault . . .  is about equal to the frequency of husband-on­
wife assault" (p. 243). The disparities, however, arise when it comes to 
injuries arising from such assaults (p. 243). Women are more likely to 
suffer injuries following a domestic assault than men because men hit 
harder than women. 66 Additionally, many wife-on-husband assaults 
may actually be defensive (and justifiable). 
60. P. 246 ("A sidearm can 'equalize' physical disparity between a woman and her at­
tacker. "). 
61. For example, in 2000 hundreds of women and some men marched on Capitol Hill 
calling for stricter gun-control laws. See Susan Levine, Many Morns' Voices Are Heard on 
Mall: Rally Supporting Stricter Gun Laws Draws Thousands, WASH. POST, May 15, 2000, at 
Al. 
62. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The .22 Caliber Rorschach Test, 39 Hous. L. REV. 53, 90 (2002) 
("Members of the anti-gun culture tend to be women or men with an appreciation of femi­
nist perspectives. "); David C. Williams, Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Ou/­
groups, and the Multicultural Landscape of the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 
406-07 ( 1999). 
63. Luna, supra note 62. 
64. Alana Bassin, Why Packing a Pistol Perpetuates Patriarchy, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S 
L. J. 351, 363 (1997). 
65. See, e.g., Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republi­
canL�rn: On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 661, 
666-67 (1989) (responding to Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 
YALE L.J. 637 (1989)) ("His gun could well have made the difference between an assault 
that my hard-won skills in self-defense could have fended off and one against which they 
were useless. "). 
66. P. 243. "Recent data suggest that 50 percent of female victims of domestic abuse suf­
fer physical injuries, while only 32 percent of male victims are physically injured. " Id. 
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Thus, the fifty percent of interspousal homicides in which husbands 
kill wives are murders, but in the overwhelming majority of cases 
where wives kill husbands, they are defending themselves or their 
children. In Detroit, for instance, husbands are killed by wives more 
often than wives are by husbands, yet the men are convicted far more 
often. In fact, three-quarters of wives who killed their husbands were 
not even charged, prosecutors having found their acts lawful and 
necessary to preserve their lives or their children's. 6 7  
Finally, guns and gun ownership may serve to deter violent acts. 68 
Firing a warning shot or simply displaying a gun may dissuade an 
attacker's impending assault. 69 Access to and mere possession of a 
weapon by a woman may stop violence before it even starts. And, as 
violence against women falls because guns have neutralized the physi­
cal differences between men and women, women become more 
empowered to make their choices based on their wants and needs, not 
their fears. 
Women increasingly are becoming gun owners to protect them­
selves against aggression.7 0 Guns provide women with a mechanism to 
counter men's physical advantage. "These new gun owners . . .  view 
their gun ownership as a politically significant act, a defiance of 
ancient and oppressive gender structures." 7 1  One group devoted to 
67. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as Deterrent to Crime 
or Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 113, 128-29 (1991). "(W]hen a woman kills her 
husband, it is almost always the case that he abused her before he was killed. Homicides that 
involve women who kill their abuser should be counted as evidence of the protective effects 
of gun ownership. "  Sayoko Blodgett-Ford, Do Battered Women Have a Right to Bear Arms?, 
11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 509, 535 (1993). 
68. See, e.g., JOHN R. LOIT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME 
AND GUN-CONTROL LA ws (1998). Gun ownership deters crime and does not seem to in­
crease homicide rates. "Despite the increase in the number of firearms (between 1973-1992], 
there was no correlation with homicide rates in general nor an increase in the percentage of 
murders committed specifically with firearms. " P. 249. 
69. P. 246. "In over 92 percent of defensive gun uses, the defender succeeds by firing 
only a warning shot or never firing the gun at all. " Id. 
70. Williams, supra note 62, at 433 ("(F]or the women and guns movement, the central 
reason for arms ownership is self-defense, rather than hunting, target shooting, or revolu­
tion. "). "[S]elf-arming allows women to rely on themselves, rather than the men in their 
lives . . . .  Similarly, self-arming allows women to rely on themselves rather than on the state, 
which cannot or will not adequately protect women." Id. at 434. The argument that women 
should arm themselves for protection and to compensate for the size differential between 
themselves and their (usually) male aggressors was first made by PAXTON QUIGLEY, 
ARMED & FEMALE (1989). Additionally, Naomi Wolf advocates that women embrace 
"power feminism" by arming themselves. NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE: THE NEW 
FEMALE POWER AND How IT WILL CHANGE THE 21ST CENTURY (1993). Some pro-gun 
women have criticized anti-gun feminists for their victimization theory that suggests that 
women cannot use guns properly. "What is truly amazing is the large number of otherwise 
intelligent, so-called 'liberated' women who blandly accept and even promote the idea that 
women are incapable of defending themselves with [guns] . "  Karen McNutt, Perpetuating the 
Victim Status of Women, WOMEN & GUNS, Dec. 1991, at 7. 
71. Williams, supra note 62, at 429. Professor Williams also notes that "these new gun 
proponents tend to be politically liberal and to identify themselves as feminists. " Id. 
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women and gun deregulation, Second Amendment Sisters, formed to 
educate women about their constitutional right to bear arms and how 
gun ownership can empower them.72 
III. THE HARD CASES 
When I went to school I learned to write and how to read History, geog­
raphy and home economy And typing is a skill that every girl is sure to 
need To while away the extra time until the time to breed And then they 
had the nerve to ask, what would I like to be? I says, "I'm gonna be an 
engineer!" "No, you only need to learn to be a lady The duty isn't yours, 
for to try to run the world An engineer could never have a baby Re­
member, dear, that you're a girl" . . . .  
Well, I started as a typist but I studied on the sly Working out the day 
and night so I could qualify And every time the boss came in, he pinched 
me on the thigh Said, "I've never had an engineer!" "You owe it to the 
job to be a lady The duty of the staff is to give the boss a whirl The wages 
that you get are crummy, maybe But it's all you get, 'cause you're a 
girl" . . . .  
As soon as [husband) Jimmy got a job, I studied hard again Then busy at 
me turret-lathe a year or two, and then The morning that the twins were 
born, Jimmy says to them "Your mother was an engineer!" "You owe it 
to the kids to be a lady Dainty as a dish-rag, faithful as a chow Stay at 
home, you got to mind the baby Remember you're a mother now!" 
Every time I turn around there's something else to do Cook a meal or 
mend a sock or sweep a floor or two Listening to Jimmy Young - it 
makes me want to spew I was gonna be an engineer. I only wish that I 
could be a lady I'd do the lovely things that a lady's s'posed to do I 
wouldn't even mind if only they would pay me Then I could be a person 
too . . . . Oh, but now the times are harder and me Jimmy's got the sack; I 
went down to Vicker's, they were glad to have me back. But I'm a third­
class citizen, my wages tell me that But I'm a first-class engineer! The 
boss he says "We pay you as a lady, You only got the job because I can't 
afford a man, With you I keep the profits high as may be, You're just a 
cheaper pair of hands." You got one fault, you're a woman; You're not 
worth the equal pay. A bitch or a tart, you're nothing but heart, Shallow 
and vain, you've got no brain . ... Well, I listened to my mother and I 
joined a typing pool Listened to my lover and I put him through his 
school If I listen to the boss, I'm just a bloody fool And an underpaid en­
gineer I been a sucker ever since I was a baby As a daughter, as a 
72. See, e.g., Alexandra Hall, Girls with Guns, BOSTON MAG., Jan. 2003, at 80 (reporting 
on the Second Amendment Sisters group and its first college chapter at Mount Holyoke). 
Second Amendment Sisters formed in response to the "Million Mom March" in 2000. Id. at 
82. 
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mother, as a lover, as a dear But I'll fight them as a woman, not a lady I'll 
fight them as an engineer! 
Peggy Seeger, I'm Gonna Be an Engineer (1970). 
Peggy Seeger's song describes some of the central issues facing 
women in the workplace: employment discrimination, sexual harass­
ment, and family 73 versus work commitments. While the song harkens 
back to a time before Title VII, the Equal Pay Act, and the Family 
Medical Leave Act, 74 many women still feel like "third-class citizens." 
Is this feeling justified? Are conditions better now because of the as­
sistance of these laws? Are conditions so much better that the laws are 
no longer justified? These questions should be answered when consid­
ering whether to maintain or scrap employment laws designed to 
benefit women, but Liberty for Women's articles concerning employ­
ment discrimination and employment-related issues do not provide 
enough hard evidence to answer them. 
In Liberty for Women, Richard Epstein 75 presents the first of 
several chapters that address women and empfoyment issues.7 6 No one 
disputes that, in the past, government played a role in distorting the 
employment choices of women. 7 7  Epstein, however, stresses that indi-
73. Working women account for over seventy percent of all pregnancies each year. P. 
133. Radical feminists discount the real economic cost in terms of time and money of 
childbearing and childrearing to women. Having and raising children is a task that for either 
historical reasons or comparative advantage, or both, falls mostly on women. 
Nine out of ten men in upper-level corporate management have children and a non­
working spouse. As Deborah Rhode has pointed out, most female executives have neither. 
Almost one-third of women in senior.positions, but only six to eight percent of men, never 
marry. Only about thirty percent of women in senior positions have children, as compared to 
ninety percent of men. Ninety-three percent of married women lawyers have spouses who 
work full time, a disproportionate number of them as high-level professionals; these hus� 
bands do not provide their wives with the flow of family work available to the nearly half of 
married male attorneys who are married to housewives. Female executives also tend to be 
married to same-class males who work full time, but male executives are often married to 
homemakers. A recent DuPont study found that its male executives are now more likely to 
have an at-home wife than they were ten years ago. Davis, supra note 29, at 830 (citing JOAN 
WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 72-73 (2000)). "[D]ata suggest that, very conservatively, at least two-thirds of the 
wage gap between men and women reflects women's load of family work." WILLIAMS. su­
pra, at 15. 
74. Maternity-leave policies may harm some women. I f  government mandates maternity 
leave, it precludes women who do not plan to have children from accepting employment (for 
presumably higher wages) from firms that do not provide this fringe benefit. 
75. In other work, Epstein advocates abolishing Title VII. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992). 
Additionally, he supports scrapping Title IX. See Richard A. Epstein, Foreword: "Just Do 
It!" Title IX as a Threat to University Autonomy, 101 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
76. Pp. 30-42. The other chapters deal with women as managers, pp. 121-30; fetal­
protection laws, pp. 131-51; affirmative action, pp. 181-88; sexual-harassment laws, pp. 1 87-
202; comparable worth, pp. 203-29; and laws prohibiting midwifery, pp. 284-329. 
77. See, e.g., p. 30. Battles of the past over 
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victual choices by women, 78 and not systemic current discrimination 
against women, 7 9  generate any gender-based employment disparities 
we see today. "[E]qual opportunities will always yield unequal results" 
(p. 33), and we should not look to government to force equal results 
on individuals who freely choose the path that was best for them 
absent any discrimination.80 Thus, any government reaction to the dif­
ferences in outcomes is unjustified because individual choices gener­
ated these differences, not systematic discrimination.81 According to 
ifeminists, individuals - women and men - should compete for 
employment based on some objective standard of how well each per­
son would complete the tasks the job entails.82 
civil capacity (for example, during the nineteenth century the ability of married women to 
make contracts in their own right, to give evidence, and to serve on juries) and over political 
capacity (during the early twentieth century the right of women to vote in political elections 
and to stand for office. 
P. 30. "[H]istorically, women have been the victims of discrimination." P. 183. 
78. "The basic point is that the ordinary definition of liberty gives one not only the ca­
pacity to move about freely but also the capacity to better oneself through voluntary transac­
tions. The logic of these transactions is that of mutual gain through mutual consent." P. 31 . 
79. Libertarians, like Epstein, believe that private employers should be allowed to dis­
criminate among employees - the market, over time, will punish employers who base em­
ployment decisions on something other than merit. Individual choices make the outcomes, 
not pervasive discrimination. 
Self-ownership . . .  requires the right to discrimination . . . .  [P]eople may choose to deal with 
women in a biased and offensive manner. As long as this "discrimination" is peaceful - that 
is, it involves no physical injury or threat of harm - it is not a violation of rights. Such dis­
crimination is simply ignorant behavior, which shows incredibly poor taste. But both free­
dom of speech and freedom of association guarantee that people have the right to be wrong. 
To be offensive. To be prejudiced. Freedom of association requires the right to say "no" and 
to refuse to associate. 
P. 186. "[T]he market is to a great extent self-correcting, because it acts to penalize those 
who make business decisions in an unbusinesslike way, say by indulging in racial hatred or 
sexual stereotyping. Over the long run, such businesses will languish while their more meri­
tocratic competitors will prosper." P. 209 (citing economist Gary Becker's work on discrimi­
nation in employment). 
80. Differences in outcomes 
will reflect powerful systematic tendencies. With respect to employment and social role dif­
ferentiation by sex, the conclusion seems clear: a system of equal rights to participate in 
business and political life will result in differences of occupational choice and political 
behavior, among other things, as actual experience has amply confirmed. 
P. 33. 
81. "In many cases the difference in outcomes has not been taken as a response to sys­
tematic differences in preferences between men and women. Rather it has been viewed as 
proof that the system itself does not operate in the proper fashion." Id. 
82. !feminism calls for the removal of government from individuals' decisionmaking -
whether that individual is employer or a potential employee - and for men and women to 
be treated equally before the law. This entails removing government restrictions on women's 
ability to compete with men, such as the protective labor laws and restrictions on property 
ownership and inheritance of the past. Radical feminism on the other hand, supports using 
government to prevent discrimination in the market. 
Although legal barriers to women had largely fallen, it was argued that the ill effects of 
history still impacted modern women. The lingering injustice was especially blatant in the 
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The persistent differences between the sexes lead to both behavioral and 
attitudinal differences. The effects are not cabined into some tiny area of 
human life - they influence all our experiences and interactions. We 
must oppose the common view that equality of opportunity, rightly con­
ceived, necessarily and properly brings about equality of results. More 
specifically we should not try to tinker with the outcomes of markets by 
imposing the strong norm of equality of results, which we cannot and 
should not achieve, given the differences of preferences and abilities of 
men and women . . . .  Rather than posit our knowledge of what the ends 
should be, we should let the process run as it will, taking care to see that 
no major impediments interfere with bargaining and career choice. (p. 
41) 
This explanation, however, begs the question. Did past discrimina­
tion distort these "choices?"8 3 This is basically a "chicken or the egg" 
problem: if past discrimination resulted in women being excluded 
from certain professions, does that past discrimination affect choices 
today? Did discrimination by employers lead to women's jobs being 
limited and did the resulting definition of "woman's work," force 
women into certain types of employment? 
Past discrimination could take many forms limiting women's em­
ployment choices. For example, in education, girls may be implicitly or 
explicitly steered away from math or science.84 This bias could lead 
girls to see their choices as more limited than boys'. 85 This calls for 
concerted efforts by today's feminists (of all varieties) to spread the 
word that women can, be whatever they want, no matter the field.86 
Radical feminists have forgotten this mantra - their concentration on 
marketplace, which continued to undervalue women's work. The removal of legal barriers 
had not cured this exploitation; legal protection was required. It was necessary for the law to 
prefer women in order for the marketplace to treat them fairly. 
P. 183. 
83. Ideally, in a world with no past discrimination, men and women would compete for 
jobs based on their natural talents alone. Basically, to analogize to Justice Harlan's famous 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the world would be "sex-blind" or "gender-blind." Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
84. Rosemary Salomone, Rich Kids, Poor Kids, and the Single-Sex Education Debate, 34 
AKRON L. REV. 209, 213 & nn.10-13 (2000) (citing AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN 
EDUC. FOUND., GIRLS IN THE MIDDLE: WORKING TO SUCCEED IN SCHOOL (1996); 
AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW 
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1993); AMERICAN ASS'N OF 
UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., How SCHOOLS SHORTCHANGE GIRLS (1992); AMERICAN 
ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN EDUC. FOUND., SHORTCHANGING GIRLS, SHORTCHANGING 
WOMEN (1991)). 
85. In a public-school setting, this would amount to discrimination by government. In 
private schools, parents could react to any bias towards their daughters by removing them 
from the schools. 
86. Camille Paglia notes that "the education and training of Western women must be 
better designed to prepare them for leadership positions in business and politics. " P. 27. 
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"woman-as-victim"8 7  may actually exacerbate the problem of women 
viewing their choices as limited.88 
Past government-sanctioned discrimination in employment89 could 
generate society-wide ideas about what is "woman's work." Epstein 
does not address whether natural talents9 0  or discriminatory laws led 
women to choose some occupations over others by sending signals to 
girls that those were women's jobs. 
In the past, women were discriminated against by government, the 
education system, and employers. !feminists concentrate on past 
government discrimination to explain why women's options were 
limited. With that type of discrimination largely eliminated, ifeminists 
believe any disparities between men and women in the workplace 
result solely from women's individual choices about which careers to 
pursue. Removing governmental barriers may not be enough, how­
ever, to produce the equality of opportunity that ifeminists hold so 
dear. First, it remains unclear whether applying antidiscrimination 
laws to private employers assisted women by countering past discrimi­
nation. Equally murky is whether these laws, even if beneficial in the 
past, continue to provide benefits to women that outweigh the costs 
imposed on employers and nonfavored groups. Liberty for Women 
presents a strong argument for why government barriers should be 
removed for women in the workforce, but does not sufficiently address 
whether government interventions - such as Title VII or the Equal 
Pay Act of 1963 - have assisted in breaking down private barriers. 
Before the argument for removing government interventions can be 
considered, feminists and policymakers need more information about 
the costs and benefits associated with these policies. 
87. The media, on occasion, promotes this "woman-as-victim" image. 
Reporters on Fox News Channel and MSNBC are displaying an exceedingly annoying habit 
of referring to [Prisoner of War from Operation Iraqi Freedom] Pfc. Jessica Lynch as just 
"Jessica" in news stories, the better to tug the viewers' paternal/maternal heartstrings. But 
Jessica Lynch is not the little girl who fell down the well. She is a U.S. soldier serving in 
harm's way. If you're old enough to be a POW, you're old enough to be referred to as 
"Private Lynch." Even if you're female. 
Virginia Postrel, Little Jessica, at http://www.dynamist.com/weblog/archives/000059.html (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2003). 
88. "Many women are repulsed by the [radical feminist] notion that [women] are men's 
victims. They don't feel like victims, and believe that feminists' descriptions make them 
sound like losers." Williams, supra note 28, at 377. 
89. "Protective" labor laws provide one example of government-sanctioned employ­
ment discrimination against women. See NOVKOY, supra note 11, at 133. 
90. One contributor, Mimi Gladstein, says that management skills are among women's 
natural talents. "When one has balanced the needs of home and family and a professional 
life, one does not survive unless one develops sound managerial skills." P. 123. 
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. CONCLUSION 
For easy cases, Liberty for Women provides convincing evidence 
that providing women with greater freedom to pursue the literature, 
work, and self-defense methods of their choice maximizes their wel­
fare. Banning pornography silences women. Criminalizing prostitution 
leads law enforcement to view prostitutes as criminals and discount 
their claims of abuse. Laws prohibiting prostitution also deny some 
women one of the few employment options available to them. Laws 
restricting gun ·  ownership leave women virtually defenseless against 
stronger male aggressors. Liberty for Women contributes to the femi­
nist debate in these easier cases where governmental laws designed to 
benefit women actually harm them. There may be other rationales 
supporting these laws, but the protection and benefit of women cannot 
serve as a justification. The anecdotal, historical, and statistical 
evidence provided in the book should persuade some women to 
reconsider their views. 
Liberty for Women's justification for laissez-faire individualism in 
harder cases where it remains unclear .whether government action 
harms or benefits women, however, lacks evidentiary · support. For 
these harder cases, like employment discrimination, a reader who is 
not an ifeminist or at least sympathetic to libertarian views will not be 
persuaded. Liberty for Women provides .evidence justifying the 
removal of governmental barriers to women's employment, but fails to 
address adequately whether government interventions for the benefit 
of women - such as Title VII and the Equal Pay Act of 1963 - have 
had positive impacts by breaking down private barriers. Are "liberty" 
interests enough to condemn these governmental acts? It seems thin 
to justify repealing what may be beneficial laws based solely on 
dogmatic interests in individual autonomy. This is not to say that 
ifeminism cannot convince women on these issues; it just seems 
unlikely that Liberty for Women will do so without more evidence. 
